WAITING FOR TRUMP

The US President Will Perform Theatre of the Absurd in a Polite Beijing

7 May 2026

Summary

Trump’s long-anticipated visit to Beijing is shaping up less as a diplomatic breakthrough than a politely staged political spectacle. Beneath the photo ops and grand ceremony, the US-China trade war is intensifying across sanctions, payment systems, tariffs, technology, and energy. Any agreements announced will be symbolic, and fragile, leaving the deeper conflicts all unresolved after Air Force One departs.

IN Samuel Beckett’s Waiting for Godot, two men endlessly wait for someone who never arrives, filling the time with repetitive conversations that expose the absurdity of human existence. President Trump’s visit to China increasingly resembles a parody of Beckett’s play: anticipation surrounding an event unlikely to produce anything meaningful.

The heart of the China-US relationship is trade. Since China’s restrictions on rare earth exports pushed Trump to retreat from imposing the highest tariffs on Chinese goods, the conflict has not calmed. Instead, it has spread into new areas and continues escalating even as the US Air Force delivers “the Beast” — the presidential limousine — to Beijing.

Preparations for the trip were reportedly so weak that Trump was not ready to travel at the end of March. The Iran War offered a convenient reason to postpone and begin actual planning. Yet “planning” means something very different for Trump, who favors improvisation, than for Xi Jinping, whose government prepares meticulously for every scenario. China has not even officially confirmed Trump’s arrival and may not do so until he steps off Air Force One.

Trading Advance Blows

Normally, summit meetings between major powers are preceded by months of negotiations that produce agreements ready for signing, perhaps with a few points to still be finalized face to face. This visit is different. Instead of preparing deals, both sides are trading blows in advance.

Washington recently announced new sanctions on Chinese refineries buying Iranian oil. Western media then reported that China had “blocked sanctions against 5 Chinese companies.” What actually happened was more significant: Beijing began enforcing a 2020 law allowing compliance with certain US sanctions to be treated as illegal in China, a highly significant counter-move.

The United States currently maintains roughly 70,000 sanctions, including measures against 1,300 Chinese entities. Until now, Washington could enforce them easily by restricting access to cross-border banking. Because most international payments move through US-linked CHIPS and SWIFT systems, the US can effectively cut entities out of global finance, something it has already done to companies and individuals in around 20 countries, sometimes amounting to the entire country.

Now companies operating in China may increasingly face a choice between violating American law or Chinese law. They may also have to choose which international payment network to rely on in order to avoid penalties from the other side.

China’s CIPS payment system processes nearly ¥1 trillion in transactions daily and is expanding rapidly. Total annual volume is expected to reach around ¥300 trillion this year, up sharply from ¥180 trillion in 2025. While Western media often note that the yuan accounts for only a small share of SWIFT transactions, CIPS is an alternative to SWIFT. Meanwhile, transaction growth in America’s CHIPS system has stagnated since 2001. BRICS is also preparing to launch BRICS Pay in India later this year, promising faster and cheaper international transactions outside US-controlled systems, this for 45% of the world's population enjoying the majority of global economic growth.

Another confrontation emerged in March when the US Trade Representative launched investigations into “structural excess capacity” involving 16 trading partners, including China, India, Japan, South Korea, Mexico, the European Union, and Southeast Asian nations. The argument now emerging in Washington is that countries capable of producing competitively priced exports at large scale are effectively “cheating” through "excess capacity".

The investigations are intended to provide Trump with a legal route to impose higher tariffs again after the US Supreme Court struck down most of his earlier efforts. China strongly objects and would likely answer any renewed tariffs with further restrictions on rare earth exports, reluctantly repeating the cycle.

These are only a few examples of widening trade-war hostilities. The conflict now includes technology bans extending beyond semiconductors, myriad selective tariffs such as on Chinese dock cranes!, China’s recruitment of scientists from the United States where science funding is being cut, a US blockade on Chinese energy supplies through the Gulf of Oman, and tighter control over Venezuelan oil exports, much of which are going to China. Trump’s visit is unlikely to resolve any of it. It will mostly be political theatre, though probably flamboyant theatre as Xi is wise enough to know what a narcissistic, megalomaniac craves.

Waiting for Trump — The Show

For Trump, the Beijing trip is about short-term optics and boosting weak domestic approval ahead of November midterm elections that Republicans will probably lose badly. He will want memorable images: perhaps smiling alongside Xi Jinping at the Great Hall of the People or posing with the two first ladies if Melania Trump attends.

Xi approaches politics from a long-term strategic perspective, while Trump has little patience for long-term commitments. That mismatch makes meaningful progress unlikely, whether on trade, Ukraine, the Strait of Hormuz, the Gulf of Oman, technology, or AI. Still, Xi will almost certainly provide the ceremonial grandeur and hospitality Trump enjoys, perhaps a quick Great Wall visit.

Trump will want to claim victory on tariffs, soybean exports, and access to rare earth minerals. Beijing may offer limited concessions to help him declare success while securing some benefits of its own, perhaps reaffirmation of US commitment to One China and the three U.S.-China Joint Communiqués regarding Taiwan Province (台灣省).

Neither side fully trusts the other to honor promises. China knows Trump may reverse course quickly, while Trump mainly needs any agreement to survive until November so he can present it as a triumph at home.

China is also less vulnerable to US tariffs than before. American demand now accounts for only about 11% of Chinese exports and could fall to roughly 7% by 2030. China increased its exports by 5% in 2025 compared to 2024. Meanwhile, Chinese imports of American agricultural products never fully recovered after the first trade war. Brazilian soybeans remain cheaper, meaning any future increase in US purchases would mostly represent a partial reversal of earlier Chinese cuts rather than new demand.

After two days of ceremony and oversized announcements, Trump will return to Florida proclaiming “an incredible deal” with his “good friend Xi Jinping.” He will describe the visit as historic and successful. In reality, little of lasting significance is likely to have changed. The spectacle will end with the sense that everyone was waiting for Trump to arrive so that something meaningful could happen, but that nothing did — as if an American President had simply never shown up.

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